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THE SUPPORT STRUCTURE FOR 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LITIGATION IN THE ROBERTS COURT:  
A RESEARCH AGENDA 
ANN SOUTHWORTH* 
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission1 and McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission,2 have sparked enormous public 
controversy over the Roberts Court’s stance toward the 
regulation of money in politics.3 Supporters of the decisions 
laud them for striking down dangerous restrictions on freedom 
of speech,4 while critics assert that they have struck a terrible 
blow against democratic values and electoral integrity.5 These 
 
 *  Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine, School of Law. I 
am grateful to participants in UC Irvine Law School’s Summer Workshop Series 
for advice at the outset of the project described in this essay. Thanks also to Aaron 
Benmark, Alexander Danielyan, Yashina Burns, and Thomas Eisweirth for their 
research assistance. 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down a prohibition on the use of corporate or 
union treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications or express 
advocacy not coordinated with a campaign).  
 2. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (finding unconstitutional federal aggregate limits 
on contributions to candidates, political parties, and political action committees). 
 3. President George W. Bush nominated John Roberts in 2005, initially to 
succeed retiring Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. When Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist died before Roberts’s confirmation hearings, President Bush 
nominated Roberts to become the new Chief Justice.  
 4. See, e.g., FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES 
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT 303–47 (2013) (defending the ruling in Citizens 
United); Bradley A. Smith, Free Speech at Last: McCutcheon Decision Just Right, 
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/374894/ 
free-speech-last-mccutcheon-decision-just-right-bradley-smith, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/GP6E-AMXV (describing McCutcheon as “another step toward 
protecting political speech”). 
 5. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Future of Campaign Finance Laws, 
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/court-
608924-political-campaign.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E5HA-FQZP (“Those 
who spend huge sums, after McCutcheon, in contributions to political parties will 
be rightly perceived as having undue influence over the government that they 
helped to elect.”); Richard L. Hasen, Worse Than Watergate: The New Campaign 
Finance Order Puts the Corruption of the 1970s to Shame, SLATE (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/campaign_
finance_after_citizens_united_is_worse_than_watergate_.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/9DZZ-H3UK (“How does the brave new world of campaign financing 
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decisions have attracted a great deal of scholarly 
commentary—analyzing the confused history of campaign 
finance doctrine, the evolution of the Justices’ views on these 
issues, and the reasoning, wisdom, and policy implications of 
the rulings.6 
My current book project differs from much of the existing 
scholarship on the Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions 
because it investigates processes that precede adjudication and 
focuses on how actors other than judges have helped to create 
conditions conducive to constitutional change. The research 
traces what might be viewed as the supply-side of adjudication, 
or what another scholar, Charles Epp, has called the “support 
structure” for legal mobilization.7 This support structure 
includes the organizations that have teed up campaign finance 
cases for adjudication, the lawyers who have represented the 
parties and amici, the scholars and interest groups that have 
cultivated and advanced the ideas adopted in the Court’s 
decisions, and the financial patrons and advocacy networks 
that have supported that process.8 
What are the various organizations and who are the 
lawyers on both sides of these cases about the expressive rights 
of corporations and wealthy donors in electoral politics? What 
interests and constituencies do they claim to represent? Which 
of these organizations characterize themselves as public 
interest groups, and what vision of the public good do they 
 
created by the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision stack up against 
Watergate? The short answer is: Things are even worse now than they were 
then.”).  
 6. See, e.g., RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, WHEN MONEY SPEAKS: THE 
MCCUTCHEON DECISION, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(2014); ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM (2014); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 86–88 (2014); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN 
AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014); 
Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in FIRST AMENDMENT 
STORIES 345–73 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012); Richard 
L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 
(2011); Michael S. Kang, Party-Based Corruption and McCutcheon v. FEC, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 240 (2014); Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get Into 
this Mess? Observations on the Legitimacy of Citizens United, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
203 (2011).  
 7. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17–20 (1998).  
 8. For a study of one very important element of this support structure, the 
Federalist Society, see AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES, 
61–89 (2015). 
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purport to advance? What lawyers and other types of resources 
do the organizations bring to the effort? What are the lines of 
agreement and disagreement among the advocates, advocacy 
organizations, and their financial backers, and how united or 
fragmented are the parties and amici? Are there obvious 
patterns in the types of arguments made and the language and 
metaphors, keywords, and turns of phrase used to advance the 
arguments? What are these advocates’ ties to one another and 
to private law firms, political parties, and bar associations with 
particular ideological commitments, such as the Federalist 
Society and American Constitution Society?9 
Eventually, I plan to study the support structure for a long 
line of campaign finance cases from Buckley v. Valeo10 through 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.11 So far, however, 
the research focuses primarily on two especially significant 
campaign finance decisions of the Roberts Court: Citizens 
United,12 which found unconstitutional a provision of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)13 limiting 
corporate expenditures in federal elections,14 and McCutcheon, 
which invalidated overall limits on the total contributions an 
individual can give in an election cycle.15 In Citizens United, 
the Court found that corporations, like individuals, have a 
First Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts on 
elections.16 The decision overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce, which upheld a Michigan statute limiting the 
amount that corporations could spend to support or oppose 
candidates in elections for state offices,17 and McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission, which upheld the very provision 
of the BCRA invalidated in Citizens United.18 In McCutcheon, 
the Court rejected the notion that the government may 
 
 9. In her analysis of the influence of the Federalist Society’s “epistemic 
community” on campaign finance doctrine, Hollis-Brusky identified many 
Federalist Society connections among advocates and scholars. However, she did 
not attempt to identify all such ties among the lawyers who participated in the 
litigation. See id. at 61–89.   
 10. 424 U.S. 1, 5–43 (1976). 
      11.  134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 12. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
 14. 558 U.S. at 311–16.  
 15. 134 S. Ct. at 1437–40. 
 16. 558 U.S. at 314. 
 17. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 18. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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regulate campaign contributions to prevent the kind of broad 
political influence or access that an individual might acquire by 
contributing to an unlimited number of candidates and political 
committees.19 
The research will pursue three broad issues. First, it will 
explore the resources and alignments of organizations active in 
these cases. With assistance from an excellent team of research 
assistants, I have gathered data about the organizations’ tax 
statuses, annual revenues, founding dates, board members, 
and foundation contributors. I have identified the allies and 
adversaries among the litigants, and I am examining how the 
organizations’ positions relate to their missions and those of 
their financial patrons. The cases are complex, and the briefs 
take a variety of different stances, some quite absolute and 
others more nuanced. I will analyze the positions of various 
constituencies—business and trade groups, libertarians, 
liberals, civil libertarians, religious conservatives, unions, 
political parties, etc.—and the extent to which they have 
agreed and disagreed across and within their respective blocks. 
I will consider, for example, whether business groups were 
united in opposition to the campaign finance regulations and 
whether and to what extent the arguments of ideologically 
motivated nonprofit organizations coincided with those of 
groups representing the interests of for-profit corporations. I 
will review why the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
took the side of the appellant in Citizens United and against 
the position of many of their usual liberal allies, and why it 
declined to file a brief in McCutcheon. I will also examine 
whether the primary financial patrons of the groups on 
opposing sides of these cases overlapped or were themselves 
divided. 
Second, this project will investigate the characteristics of 
lawyers active in campaign finance litigation and the structure 
of their advocacy network. Using publicly available information 
on all lawyers who have filed briefs in these cases, I will 
research the advocates’ backgrounds, educational credentials, 
employers, political contributions, and ties to bar groups. I will 
systematically analyze the characteristics of the lawyers for the 
various constituencies represented in this litigation, not only in 
the Supreme Court but also in the lower courts. The study will 
 
     19.  McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460–65 (2014). 
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explore the lawyers’ networks, using social network software 
and data about the lawyers’ organizational affiliations, drawn 
from the lawyers’ biographies and other public sources. I will 
also interview some of these lawyers to better understand their 
values, purposes, strategies, efforts to coordinate with one 
another, and struggles over control of the litigation agenda. 
Preliminary analyses of some of the characteristics of the 
lawyers who filed briefs in the Supreme Court in Citizens 
United and McCutcheon suggest that there are substantial 
differences in the educational backgrounds, work locations, and 
party allegiances of lawyers for the opposing sides.20 In Citizens 
United, more than four-fifths of the lawyers filing briefs in the 
Supreme Court on appellee’s (Federal Election Commission’s) 
side attended law schools ranked in the top twenty in the U.S. 
News and World Report rankings,21 as compared to just half of 
lawyers filing briefs on the appellant’s (Citizens United’s) 
side.22 Just 2 percent of lawyers for appellee’s side attended 
local law schools, defined as schools ranked below fifty, as 
compared with one-third of lawyers for appellant’s side. In 
McCutcheon, those differences in educational background were 
even more pronounced, perhaps because lawyers for the ACLU 
and several other civil liberties groups that tend to attract elite 
lawyers and were on the appellant’s side in Citizens United did 
not participate in McCutcheon.23 There were also notable 
 
    20.    See Ann Southworth, presentation for panel on “Lawyers, Networks, and 
Institutions: Examining the ‘Support Structure’ for Legal Development,” Law & 
Society Annual Meeting (May 30, 2015). 
 21. Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/law-rankings?int=992008 (last visited Feb. 8, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/E6A8-8S5L. 
 22. The data used for these analyses came from Martindale-Hubbell entries 
and the websites of the lawyers’ employers. See, e.g., MARTINDALE.COM, 
http://www.martindale.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc 
/4ZK9-QBKL.  
 23. The ACLU’s opposition to campaign finance limitations has been highly 
controversial within the organization. See generally Ronald Collins, The ACLU & 
the McCutcheon Case, SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:07 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/the-aclu-the-mccutcheon-case, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D3H2-GGNF (commenting on the controversy within the ACLU 
over campaign finance laws, the filing of briefs by the ACLU and former officials 
of the ACLU on different sides of the First Amendment issue in six Supreme 
Court cases on campaign finance, and the ACLU’s failure to file a brief in 
McCutcheon). On September 4, 2014, six former leaders of the ACLU submitted to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee a letter stating that the current leadership of the 
national ACLU “has endorsed a deeply contested and incorrect reading of the 
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geographic differences. In both cases, a large proportion of the 
lawyers on both sides worked in Washington, D.C. However, a 
much higher percentage of the lawyers on the appellant’s side 
than the appellee’s side worked in the South and Midwest and 
a much lower percentage in the Northeast. In both cases, 
among those lawyers who made political contributions, the 
overwhelming majority on appellant’s side gave exclusively or 
primarily to Republicans, while those on appellee’s side 
strongly favored Democrats. 
These sharp differences are perhaps unsurprising given 
that campaign finance has become a highly partisan issue in 
recent years and that party affiliation is linked to social 
background and geography. Still, it does not necessarily follow 
that the lawyers representing the opposing sides should 
themselves display those differing characteristics. Interviews 
with the advocates may help explain how the lawyers’ 
backgrounds, values, and political commitments relate to their 
professional identities. 
Third, I will study the role of organizations and advocates 
in promoting some of the controversial ideas adopted in the 
Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions but strongly 
criticized by the dissenters (and some commentators). In 
Citizens United, for example, one of the majority opinion’s 
disputed claims is that the corporate identity of the speaker 
should be irrelevant in determining the permissibility of the 
regulation.24 The majority asserted that regulatory distinctions 
among types of speakers—e.g., individuals, nonprofits, for-
profit corporations, etc.—constitute a type of pernicious and 
impermissible discrimination: “The First Amendment does not 
 
First Amendment as a rigid deregulatory straitjacket that threatens the integrity 
of American democracy.” Letter from Former Leaders of the ACLU to Members of 
the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, (Sept. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.commoncause.org/policy-and-litigation/letters-to-government-
officials/National_090414_Civil_Rights_Experts-Letter-Amend.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DVV6-M32A. The ACLU’s Legislative Director, Laura Murphy, 
issued a strong response, reaffirming the ACLU’s opposition to the regulation of 
campaign expenditures but its support of public financing for election campaigns. 
See Ronald K.L. Collins, Six Former ACLU Leaders Contest Group’s 1st 
Amendment Position on Campaign Finance – ACLU’s Legislative Director 
Responds, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/09/fan-30-1-first-amendment-
news-six-former-aclu-leaders-contest-groups-1st-amendment-position-on-
campaign-finance-aclus-legislative-director-responds.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/KY3V-XHYJ.  
     24.  558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).  
SOUTHWORTH_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2015  4:58 PM 
2015] CAMPAIGN FINANCE LITIGATION 1227 
permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based 
on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of 
political speech.”25 The dissent took strong issue with the 
Court’s critique of identity-based distinctions: 
The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its 
iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that 
the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on 
a speaker’s identity, including its “identity” as a 
corporation. . . . The conceit that corporations must be 
treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere 
is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the 
Court’s disposition of this case.26 
Another feature of the majority’s opinion that drew criticism is 
its characterization of the challenged limitations on corporate 
expenditures as “an outright ban on speech.”27 The dissent 
again disapproved of the majority’s rhetoric: “Pervading the 
Court’s analysis is the ominous image of a ‘categorical ba[n]’ on 
corporate speech. Indeed, the majority invokes the specter of a 
‘ban’ on nearly every page of its opinion. This characterization 
is highly misleading . . . .”28 The dissent also faulted the 
majority opinions in Citizens United and McCutcheon for 
asserting that the only justification for regulating campaign 
expenditures is to avoid quid pro quo corruption29—something 
close to outright bribery. The dissent in Citizens United 
rejected the “majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo 
arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper 
influences” and that only the former constitute a sufficient 
threat to justify limits on expenditures.30 
I will assess what role the advocates have played in 
serving up competing frames for the Court and advancing ideas 
eventually adopted by the majority.31 One of the qualitative 
data management software packages used in this research, 
 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 394. 
 27. Id. at 312. 
 28. Id. at 415 (citation omitted).  
 29. Id. at 313. 
 30. Id. at 448. 
 31. In subsequent publications, I may explore the litigants’ influence on 
dissenters, but I am primarily interested in how litigants contributed to the 
arguments that prevailed. 
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ATLASti, offers “word crunching” formulas, which count 
appearances of a particular word or phrase in a document or 
set of documents, while allowing the user to check the context 
in which the word or phrase appears. Applying these tools to 
the briefs in Citizens United demonstrates that the appellant 
and supporters took great pains to advance the argument 
against the permissibility of any type of distinction based on 
the identity of the speaker; they characterized limits on 
corporate expenditures as a form of invidious discrimination. 
They also repeatedly described the regulation as a “ban” on 
speech or expression. The briefs of appellants and some of their 
supporters in Citizens United and McCutcheon portrayed 
political influence and access gained through political 
expenditures and contributions as inevitable and 
unproblematic features of representative democracy. 
Systematic parsing of the briefs and sources cited in them—
with help from language-analysis software—may shed light on 
how advocates employed key words, concepts, and turns of 
phrase (as well as precedents) in their efforts to influence the 
Court. Interviews with the advocates may also reveal how and 
to what extent the litigants and amici coordinated their efforts 
to persuade the Court to adopt these frames. 
Overall, this research focuses on how political actors other 
than judges have contributed to the processes that have 
generated constitutional change in campaign finance doctrine. 
The project’s goal is to use both quantitative and qualitative 
social science methods to explore the role that advocates, 
advocacy organizations, and their patrons and networks have 
played in litigating constitutional change in this area, 
complementing approaches that focus primarily on judicial 
behavior and the policy implications of what judges decide. 
 
